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Employment relations in the UK civil service 
Author: Andy Hodder (Department of Management, Birmingham Business School, 
University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK) 
Abstract: 
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to bring together two separate strands of the 
literature (politics and industrial relations) on civil service management and reform to 
enable consideration of the industrial relations implications of these changes. 
Design/methodology/approach – This paper is conceptual and has no empirical base. The 
paper is a general review of existing literature on the subject. 
Findings – The paper identifies the importance of historical legacy in both management and 
union behaviour in the civil service. By revisiting earlier civil service reforms, the reader is 
able to gain an understanding of the rationale for much of the current restructuring of the 
civil service. Additionally, any discussion of trade union behaviour should be located in the 
context of union tradition and evolution. 
Research limitations/implications – In being a general review, the paper does not report 
empirical evidence but instead provides the background for future research into civil service 
industrial relations and management. 
Originality/value – This paper is the first to provide a systematic review of management 
restructuring in the civil service whilst at the same time considering union responses. As 
such, the paper is of interest to academics and practitioners in the areas of both 
management and politics. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper provides a general review of civil service reform and subsequent trade union 
responses in the UK. Whilst much has been written about civil service reform, this is 
predominantly from a political viewpoint, often ignoring the industrial relations implications 
of restructuring. Where industrial relations academics have engaged with the civil service, 
they tend to focus on structural issues and somewhat surprisingly, detailed accounts of 
union responses are often neglected. Missing from the literature is an overview of civil 
service restructuring and its implications for trade unionism. This paper provides an outline 
of civil service reform before analysing union responses. Whilst this account is not all-
encompassing, it is hoped that it goes some way to bridging the gap between the two 
bodies of literature. 
 
It is necessary to understand and analyse the development of the non-industrial civil service 
in the UK, reforms to its structures and union responses to such changes as “union 
responses to changes in the economic, social and political environment are shaped by the 
nature of their own previous historical choices and strategies” (Martinez Lucio, 1999, p. 92). 
The term “civil” “implies a distinction not with the military service but with the ‘political’ 
service consisting of Ministers responsible to Parliament” (Hanson and Walles, 1975, p. 
133). The civil service has “never been constituted on a formal legal basis” (Pollitt et al., 
2004, p. 100) and as such, the prime minister, and in some cases ministers can change the 
functions and structures of government bodies and departments without the need for 
legislation or discussion in parliament. By its very nature, the civil service traditionally differs 
from privately run companies, with civil servants being required to act in the public interest, 
as opposed to private sector workers who act for the benefit of owners/shareholders. 
However, increasing privatisation and contracting out of (non-core) services has meant that 
the civil service landscape is ever changing. The paper looks briefly at the current state of 
the civil service before discussing the impact of restructuring on the employment of civil 
servants and the various union responses over time. 
 
There is no one precise definition of a civil servant in legal terms, although a working 
definition offered by Burnham and Pyper (2008, p. 19) states that “the Civil Service 
encompasses officials who are employed, in various capacities, by UK central government 
departments and the devolved administrations in Scotland and Wales”. The following quote 
exemplifies the specific position of civil servants regarding their employment “for historical 
reasons, servants of the Crown are treated in common law as a separate category of 
employee and are not regarded as having a ‘contract of service’ in the normal sense. The 
main difference is that theoretically a Crown servant is dismissible at any time at the will of 
the Crown” (Keter, 2005, p. 1). 
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The civil service today has undergone a great deal of reform but can be divided into three 
broad types of governmental department: Ministerial departments, Non-Ministerial 
departments and Executive Agencies. Ministerial departments make-up the more 
recognisable part of public administration, usually operating under the direction of Cabinet 
Ministers. Examples of Ministerial departments include the Department for Work and 
Pensions (DWP), the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the Ministry of Justice (MOJ). Non-
Ministerial departments do not come under direct control of a Minister, instead being 
headed by senior civil servants to avoid political interference in the running of the 
department. As of 31 March 2013, civil service employment was 448,835 of which 76 per 
cent were full-time employees. Approximately half of all employees (full and part time) 
were female (53 per cent). 9.6 per cent of all employees were from black and minority 
ethnic backgrounds and 8.6 per cent of civil servants declared themselves disabled. The 
median pay for a full-time civil servant was £24,380 in 2013. 
 
Non-industrial civil servants are currently represented by three trade unions. Prospect, 
formed in 2001, represents a mixture of engineers, managers, scientists and specialists 
across the civil service and privatised agencies and has approximately 100,000 members. 
FDA (formerly known as the First Division Association) represents senior civil servants as 
well as economists, diplomats, lawyers and National Health Service (NHS) managers and has 
approximately 16,000 members. The largest is the Public and Commercial Services union 
(PCSs) which was formed in 1998. The PCS represents approximately 280,000 lower and 
middle grade civil servants, and those working on government contracts in privatised 
industries. 
 
Following this brief discussion of the current state of the civil service, the paper is organised 
chronologically as both the current political and industrial relations issues in the civil service 
can only be understood in an historical context. The paper ends with an assessment of the 
civil service employment relations and raises questions about union responses to the 
present programme of cuts to civil service jobs, terms and conditions. 
 
2. Civil service management and reform 
The civil service has long been subjected to attempts to alter the boundaries between the 
workforce and the state as employer. Indeed, “whenever the Government has considered it 
necessary to curtail its expenditure or to reduce the national wage bill, it has had a tempting 
and easily accessible target in the Civil Service” (Allen, 1960, p. 80). This statement, despite 
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being written over 50 years ago, still holds true today. Since the Northcote-Trevelyan Report 
of 1854, there have been substantial enquiries into the running of the civil service. At this 
time, pay in the public sector was determined following commissions and inquiries. 
However, the system radically changed and further developed in 1919 with the introduction 
of Whitley Councils. 
 
2.1. From Whitley to Thatcher 
High levels of industrial unrest experienced during the First World War led to the 
Government in 1915 establishing a committee, chaired by J. H. Whitley, to investigate the 
problem. This committee recommended a centralised system of collective bargaining within 
the private sector and, following requests from the civil service unions, the Whitley system 
of unified national bargaining was introduced across the public sector, its objective within 
the civil service being “to secure the greatest co-operation between the state in its capacity 
as employer, and the general body of Civil Servants in matters affecting the Civil Service, 
with a view to increasing efficiency in the public service, combined with the well-being of 
those employed; to provide machinery for dealing with grievances, and generally to bring 
together the experience and different points of view of representatives of the 
administrative clerical and manipulative Civil Service” (Dunnill, 1956, pp. 56-57). 
 
Whitley Councils were set up as a consultative system for Joint Industrial Councils between 
the staff associations, which had developed in the civil service, and the state as an employer 
on a national level. The Whitley system encouraged the recognition of trade unionism and 
“made the state more accountable to the public for decisions on management, recruitment 
and rewarding staff” (Prowse and Prowse, 2007, p. 49). Civil service wide wage grades were 
established in 1920 on the principle of “fair relativity” (Allen, 1960, p. 84) and the unions 
were complicit in this move. 
 
The development of the Whitley system meant that “for the first time the civil service […] 
enjoyed fully recognized arrangements for collective bargaining” (Clegg, 1979, p. 32) on pay, 
terms and conditions. However the Whitley system was not without its faults, with Allen 
suggesting that it became “too rigid and formal” (Allen, 1960, p. 76), and problems still 
remained that could not be solved by Whitleyism (such as the government continuing to use 
the civil service as an easy way to cut expenditure) (Allen, 1960). Despite these faults, “they 
did not result in bad employer/employee relations in the civil service” (Allen, 1960, p. 76). 
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Wage determination became increasingly complicated and was subject to investigation 
through a Royal Commission on the Civil Service, led by Lord Tomlin between 1929 and 
1931. However limited progress was made until the Second World War (Coffey and 
Thornley, 2009, p. 96). Civil service employment reached a peak of 1.16 million in 1944 and 
following the end of the Second World War, civil service personnel policy became more 
progressive. In 1946, the ban on married women was lifted and in 1952, equal pay was 
conceded, being implemented from 1955 (Pyper and Burnham, 2011, p. 200). However, 
after 1956, the “government was prepared to be tougher with trade unions” (Coffey and 
Thornley, 2009, p. 99). Following the recommendations of the Priestley Royal Commission, 
the Pay Research Unit (PRU) was created in 1956 and the first relevant data were collected 
on comparable pay in the private sector, which has been described as an attempt to 
“enforce a policy of wage restraint on its own employees” (Allen, 1960, p. 67). 
 
Arguably the most recent series of civil service restructuring can be traced back to the 
Fulton Report of 1968. The reforms recommended by Fulton were deemed necessary as 
commentators at the time were of the opinion that the civil service was in need of 
becoming more efficient and managerially minded. The most important reforms included: 
the creation of the Civil Service Department in 1968, moving control away from the 
Treasury; the creation of a unified grading structure based upon job evaluation of the entire 
civil service (1971-1972); the move towards “accountable management”; and perhaps most 
crucially, the beginning of the “hiving off” of certain functions within each ministry to semi-
independent bodies or agencies (Barberis, 1996, p. 4). However, by 1979, many of the 
reforms advocated were not completed and “it seemed that the immediate post-Fulton 
momentum had been lost” (Barberis, 1996, p. 6). Whilst such post-Fulton reforms were 
mainly structural in nature, the attitudinal changes which occurred concurrently were to 
prove important in influencing the future Conservative governments of the 1980s. 
 
2.2. Thatcherism takes hold 
Civil service restructuring gained a new impetus under the Conservative governments of the 
1980s. Whilst the size of the civil service had been reduced to 746,000 by 1977, it was clear 
that “central to the pursuit of managerial efficiency was affordability” (Kessler, 1993, p. 
326), and the drive by Conservative governments to reduce staffing costs throughout the 
1980s and 1990s was accompanied by the introduction of New Public Management (NPM) 
polices (for an overview of NPM, see Hood, 1991). Public sector organisations are often 
portrayed as “inefficient and bureaucratic moribund organisations that serve not the public, 
but instead the people that work for them” (Greener, 2009, p. 12). The introduction of NPM 
techniques sought to resolve these ideological assumptions and demanded the adoption of 
private sector management practices, being implemented to increase levels of quality, 
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economy, efficiency and effectiveness (Worrall, et al., 2010, p. 124). This saw the 
government’s role as an employer dramatically changing from that of the model employer, 
to one focusing on implementing the best private sector management practices, with the 
aim being to deliver better services using the available resources (Bach and Kessler, 2012). 
1979 saw the creation of the Efficiency Unit, which was initially set up with the idea of 
working with the Civil Service Department, not against it. The immediate purpose was to 
make savings through identifying procedures that could either be abolished or streamlined 
in order to develop an environment in which departments “internalized efficiency-
consciousness rather than responding to ‘alien promptings’” (Barberis, 1996, p. 7). 
 
Despite their limitations and problematic nature, comparative collective negotiations based 
on the output of the Priestley Commission and subsequent PRU continued until October 
1980, when the Government refused to implement the results from the PRU (Pollitt, 1993, 
p. 52). Following a 21 week strike in 1981, the PRU was abolished, with the government 
believing that “any new system would have to be much more explicitly based on managerial 
principles” (Kessler, 1993, p. 326). After this pay dispute, the Government commissioned an 
inquiry into pay determination in the civil service, and its findings were presented in the 
Megaw Report 1982. As a result of the recommendations of the Megaw report, the 
influence of the Whitley system began to decline across much of the civil service as 
collective bargaining procedures changed from unified national bargaining to fragmented 
national bargaining and thus became “more sensitive to the occupational and organizational 
characteristics of different departments” (Winchester and Bach, 1995, p. 320). In 1981, the 
Government abolished the Civil Service Department, with the pay and manpower functions 
being transferred back to the Treasury. Recruitment and selection functions, as well as the 
Efficiency Unit, were to be included under the newly created Management and Personnel 
Office, within the Cabinet Office (Pollitt, 1993, p. 53). 
 
The Financial Management Initiative (FMI) launched in 1982, saw the development of 
management control systems and performance indicators were set to be spread out across 
the civil service, and by 1984 every department of central Government had a computerised 
budgeting system in place. Departments were encouraged to develop their own initiatives 
within a broad framework provided by the government, but central to the differing 
approaches was the increasing importance of fragmented and rational budgeting (Pyper, 
1995, pp. 63-64). The appointment of Sir Robin Ibbs as chair of the Efficiency Unit in 1983 
led to a dramatic change in its focus and although the unit still carried out efficiency drives 
with rigour, it became increasingly concerned with the failure of the FMI to achieve 
considerable change within the civil service (Barberis 1996, p. 7; Pyper 1995, p. 70). As a 
result of the Efficiency Unit, civil service staffing levels reduced by 20 per cent between 
1979 and 1986 (Kessler, 1993, p. 325). 
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Further changes were advocated in the Mueller report of 1987, when the individual civil 
service unions reluctantly agreed to systematic reform, which “incorporated the two 
competing traditions of pay determination – one rooted in a concern for comparability, the 
other in the pursuit of flexibility as a management tool” (Kessler in Winchester and Bach, 
1995, p. 319). The first agreement was reached with one union in 1987, which ended the 
collective approach to pay determination through the CCSUs and separate agreements with 
other unions subsequently followed (Fairbrother et al., 2012, p. 137). One outcome of the 
agreements reached led to the introduction in 1988 of performance-related pay (PRP) 
schemes across the civil service. PRP schemes can be defined as payment systems whereby 
“some part (conceivably all) of someone’s pay depends on an assessment of performance 
against predetermined criteria” (Arrowsmith et al., 2001, p. 114). The schemes initially 
represented an “add on” to the existing system in many respects (French, 2005, p. 28), using 
the standard civil service performance criteria and “performance pay awards taking the 
form of movements along the existing pay scale” (French, 2005) and the introduction faced 
little union opposition (Kessler, 1993, p. 329). However, this had changed by 1993 (Marsden 
and Richardson, 1994). 
 
Following a report produced by the Efficiency Unit in 1988, the civil service was to be broken 
up into more controllable sections, and the recommendation was the creation of Next Steps 
Agencies. This process removed direct responsibility for the operational activity of some 
sections of departments from ministers, leaving them free to focus primarily on policy 
development and formulation and “by analogy with the private sector, the department was 
seen as the parent company whilst agencies became its wholly owned subsidiaries” 
(Fairbrother et al., 2012, p. 64). The creation of these agencies was fundamental to the 
wider strategy of privatisation, contracting out, and market testing through the adoption of 
managerial practices from the private sector. The Next Steps programme of reform 
developed without any formal basis and lacked any legislation or policy statement upon 
which it could be judged (Talbot, 2004, p. 165). The agencies were established on the basis 
of a framework agreement, which “defines the agency’s basic functions, the flexibilities and 
freedoms available and the ways the government will control it” (Kessler, 1993, p. 334). The 
number of agencies grew from three in 1989 to 137 in 2000 and the number of bargaining 
units had reached 224 by 2004 (Lyddon, 2009, p. 322). 
 
It has been suggested that the creation of agencies had negative implications for 
employment conditions in the civil service. Agencies increasingly used flexible types of 
employment and working procedures, and concerns regarding equality provisions were also 
raised. First, it was suggested that the reduction of the middle management layer across 
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departments and agencies made it difficult for women in particular to access senior civil 
service positions (Cunningham et al., 1997, p. 67), and even more difficult due to the high 
proportion of external recruitment into the senior civil service (Bach and Kessler, 2012, p. 
38). Second, it was suggested that the agentification of the civil service “fragmented equal 
opportunities policy-making” and there were fears that this would undermine progress that 
had already been made on such matters (Bach and Kessler, 2012, p. 76). For more recent 
developments on equality in the civil service, see Corby (2011). 
 
Under The Civil Service (Management Functions) Act 1992, unified national bargaining for 
pay and conditions became fragmented national bargaining. The introduction of agencies 
enabled departments and agencies to develop existing industrial relations systems towards 
individual human resource management programmes on issues such as recruitment and 
selection of staff (Prowse and Prowse, 2007, p. 54). In addition to this, the 1993 
Performance Management Scheme “marked a radical departure in terms of pay and 
grading, combining the process of individual goal-setting, appraisal, and performance pay 
for all staff” (French, 2005, p. 29) and accompanied a “major restructuring of pay scales and 
job grades” (French, 2005, p. 30). Pay delegation, alongside the move towards agency 
status, represented the government’s aim to undermine national unified pay bargaining in 
the civil service. This soon dissolved as a consequence of agencies and their devolved 
personnel functions (Kessler, 1993, p. 334). Central to this was the dissolution of the 
national grading system, which led to the fragmentation of jobs and a of lack comparability 
across the civil service which enabled management to change concepts of what a job 
entailed beyond all recognition. 
 
In 1994, the government White Paper, The Civil Service: Continuity and Change announced 
the end of unified national pay bargaining across the civil service and from April 1996, each 
department and agency had responsibility for pay (Corby, 1997, p. 198). However, “these 
arrangements were characterised by a complex inter-relationship between a centrally 
constructed set of arrangements and delegated managerial decisions about the detailed 
arrangements” (Fairbrother et al., 2012, p. 65). Whilst agencies and departments have the 
authority to determine terms and conditions for their staff, they have to do so within the 
centrally controlled, civil service wide, Management Code, the outcome remaining “a form 
of centralised negotiations” on pay and other conditions (Fairbrother et al., 2012, p. 65), 
termed fragmented national bargaining. 
 
Additionally in the 1980s, private sector organisations had begun to act as competition 
within the public sector with the introduction of compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) in 
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the NHS and local government. Contracts were assigned to the most competitive bid 
received and this resulted in public sector work being carried out by private companies. The 
initial impact this had within the civil service was marginal as “the element of widespread 
compulsion was missing” (Pyper, 1995, p. 65). Nevertheless, by the early 1990s, some low-
grade clerical and manual tasks were subject to competitive tendering, equating to 
approximately £25 million of work per year. 1991 saw further plans for rolling out CCT 
across the rest of the public sector and the civil service was no longer exempt from the 
government’s proposals, including notably the privatisation of IT provision. 
 
The first report on the Citizen’s Charter (published in 1992) documented the extent of the 
market testing (including CCT) proposed for the civil service, totalling approximately 
£1.5billion and involved over 44,000 civil servants. By 1994, 14,500 jobs had been lost as a 
result of the testing, and there was increasing concern surrounding the future cohesion of 
the civil service as a whole (Pyper, 1995, pp. 64-72). As a result of such a move towards the 
casualisation of civil service labour, and increasing contracting out of services, a total of 
34,800 positions were lost between 1992 and 1995 (Prowse and Prowse, 2007, p. 55). In 
addition to this, it became more difficult for staff to transfer between civil service 
departments, hindering career development moves, and somewhat symbolically, the Civil 
Service Staff Transfers and Trawls Unit was closed in 1995 (Corby, 1997, p. 202). Remaining 
civil servants were subject to a freeze on pay bill costs between 1994 and 1999 whereby any 
pay awards had to be offset by productivity improvements (Corby, 1997, p. 195). From 
1996, the pay of senior civil servants was no longer subject to formal collective bargaining 
either nationally or at a department/agency level. Instead, the Senior Salaries Review body 
was established and this continues to set the pay for senior civil servants today. 
 
2.3. New labour, new challenges 
The election of New Labour in 1997 saw the continuation of the programme of civil service 
reform and continued development of the Next Steps Agencies, following a commitment 
made in 1991. Whilst the relationship between the modernisation agenda pursued by New 
Labour and NPM has been subjected to some debate, it is widely acknowledged that “the 
New Labour modernisers were effectively carrying forward many elements of the civil 
service reform agenda that was put in place by their predecessors who subscribed (in part 
or in full) to the doctrines of neo-liberalism or Conservative managerialism” (Burnham and 
Pyper, 2008, p. 53). From an employment relations perspective, successive Labour 
Governments continued implementing neo-liberal policies and the impact of this has been 
well documented (Smith and Morton, 2006). The Labour government also continued to 
pursue fragmented national pay bargaining in the civil service despite pressure from the 
unions for a return to unified national pay bargaining. This campaign became PCS policy in 
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2000 (French and Funnell, 2005, p. 6) and remains an aim of the union today. One 
concession made by the Labour government related to the return of the right to union 
membership for those workers in Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) in 
1997, albeit on the basis of a no-strike agreement (Tuckman and Finnerty, 1998, p. 448). 
 
Whilst the change in government did not signal a return to Whitley style arrangements in 
the civil service, the Blair government did consult with the unions more frequently than 
previous governments (Burnham and Pyper, 2008, p. 216). This was perhaps best 
exemplified by a partnership agreement, partnership working in the civil service, signed in 
2000 by civil service senior managers, central government and the three civil service unions. 
This agreement was designed to enhance the relationship between the government and the 
unions to foster a constructive working relationship over the modernisation agenda and 
whilst “it said nothing remarkable […] it was remarkable after the previous two decades” 
(Burnham and Pyper, 2008, p. 216 original emphasis). Despite perceived levels of optimism, 
there was concern that such partnership arrangements in the public sector actually 
challenged unions by “increasing work intensification and job losses” (Prowse and Prowse, 
2007, p. 54) and the PCS Left Unity faction has argued that the aim of the agreement was 
“to tie the hands of the union and to worsen conditions” (Beale, 2005, p. 142). 
 
Major reforms were recommended by the Gershon report of 2004, which renewed the NPM 
agenda and neoliberal quest for efficiency savings on a scale not witnessed since the 1980s. 
The government aimed to alter the make-up of the civil service and significantly reduce the 
number of civil servants by more than 100,000 by 2008 (Fairbrother et al., 2012, p. 140). 
Unsurprisingly, this was fought by the unions and resulted in a civil service wide strike in 
2004. Nevertheless, the programme of job cuts and office closures continued, with the 
Lyons review of 2007 recommending the relocation of 20,000 civil service posts out of 
London and the south-east, alongside the loss of 7,000 posts. This resulted in numerous 
campaigns against these office closures and relocation of work. The PCS strategy of resisting 
government cuts and taking industrial action led to an agreement between the Cabinet 
Office and the CCSUs in 2008 to avoid compulsory redundancies for those staff deemed 
surplus to requirements (Bach and Kessler, 2012, p. 67). 
 
Such changes in the spatial relocation of the civil service have led to the introduction of new 
forms of work organisation and there has been an increase in call centre development in 
green-field sites (Marshall et al., 2005), although the union was not initially opposed to the 
introduction of call centres in the civil service in principal, as long as intelligent work was 
retained. The PCS had little experience of “contesting the elemental changes to 
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administrative labour processes” (Fisher, 2004, p. 159), however over time it recognised the 
deskilling and Taylorist management techniques associated with call centres and now 
generally opposes such changes to work organisation. 
 
Further changes to work organisation have seen the introduction of Lean production 
techniques in DWP, HMRC and the MOD which assisted with attempts to meet the 
efficiency savings recommended by Gershon. Lean is an imprecise term with numerous 
definitions within existing literature. It is often used as a set of management practices to 
facilitate increased organisational efficiency, and within the public sector specifically, it has 
been “identified with processing improvements, error reduction and considerable 
enhancements in public service delivery” (Murphy and Simpson, 2012, p. 1). From an 
organisational point of view, the introduction and development of Lean through the 
Pacesetter programme in the civil service has been well documented (Radnor, 2010; Carter 
et al., 2012). First introduced on a trial basis in 2004, this was fully implemented across 
HMRC in 2006 “to improve efficiency and customer service by delivering 30 per cent 
improvement in productivity, reduce backlogs and inconsistencies and ensure that HMRC 
processing is amongst the best UK processors” (Radnor, 2010, p. 416). This was met with 
some resistance by PCS, as staff experienced significant increases in the intensity, pace and 
volume of work following the introduction of Lean (Carter et al., 2012). Despite the 
acknowledgement that such forms of work organisation do not properly “fit” in a public 
service (Radnor, 2010, p. 422) the union and HMRC reached an agreement on the 
management of Lean in 2011 following a ballot of members. 
 
Further reforms were announced in 2009 to make efficiency savings across the civil service. 
The reports, Putting the Frontline First and Benchmarking the back office, formed a two-
pronged attack on jobs, with the aim being to “merge back office functions, relocate staff 
and reduce Civil Service overhead costs” (Brown in HM Government, 2009b, p. 7). Putting 
the Frontline First identified areas where large savings could be made including £500 million 
through streamlining agencies and £40 million through improving sickness absence. The 
latter point led to new policies which in turn resulted in industrial action across both the 
DWP and HMRC. The aim was consistent modernisation across the whole civil service and 
following recommendations of the 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review and the 
Operational Efficiency Programme, the government re-emphasised the view that “greater 
value for money can be achieved by fuller collaboration across the public sector to share 
back office operations” (HM Government, 2009b, p. 55). In Benchmarking the back office, 
the government announced plans to restructure five back office functions (finance, HR, IT, 
procurement and property) through the development of the Next Generation Human 
Resources project (HM Government, 2009a). This was designed to “halve the number of HR 
staff in central government by developing a shared service type model in which key HR 
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activities are located in specific departments” (Bach, 2011, p. 5). The rationale behind the 
project was to develop and deliver high-quality services, whilst cutting jobs and repetition of 
work, but progress was interrupted by the general election in 2010. 
 
Civil servants have also faced civil service wide attacks on pensions and the Civil Service 
Compensation Scheme (CSCS). In 2005, the PCS successfully defended the main thrust of 
New Labour’s attacks on the pension scheme following the threat of co-ordinated action 
over public sector pensions in conjunction with UNISON, Amicus, TGWU, UCATT and FBU. 
More recently, PCS was successful in defending proposals to reduce CSCS entitlements 
proposed by New Labour in July 2009. The proposals planned to reduce civil service 
redundancy pay-outs (estimated to save approximately £500m over three years), and PCS 
responded with strike action in March 2010. However, it is difficult to assess the impact of 
the action, since it was the union’s success in gaining judicial review which stopped the 
proposed changes to the scheme. 
 
2.4. The Coalition 
The programme of reforms was temporarily halted due to the general election in 2010 but 
not for long. The Coalition immediately announced a recruitment freeze across the civil 
service for 2010-2011, estimated to save approximately £120million. Further reforms were 
announced as part of the 2010 Comprehensive Spending Review. This saw the introduction 
of “time-limited freezes on cross-government recruitment and pay […] [as] blunt 
mechanisms for controlling costs in the short-term.” (National Audit Office, 2011, p. 6). 
 
The Coalition also picked up a number of reforms developed by the previous government 
and the Next Generation Human Resources project was renamed in April 2011 as Civil 
Service Human Resources (CSHR). This is being driven by the Coalition Government, who 
plan to see a reduction of over 4,000 HR staff across the civil service by 2015 (National Audit 
Office, 2011, p. 6). PCS (2011, p. 4) has described the programme as a “vehicle for cuts in 
expenditure and HR jobs”, warning that it may lead to more privatisation, and the union 
actively opposes the job losses associated with CSHR. As the project takes hold, the civil 
service unions will have to adjust and adapt back to more centralised policy making and 
service delivery, which may have implications for union procedures and structures. These 
additional reforms were announced whilst the repercussions of both the Gershon and Lyons 
reviews were still being felt across the civil service and led to increased union resistance. 
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The Coalition Government’s Superannuation Act (2010) introduced more severe reductions 
in CSCS entitlements, capping compensation payments for compulsory redundancies at 12 
months’ salary and voluntary redundancies at 15 months’ salary. In addition to this, it 
amended the 1972 Superannuation Act, which had stated that such changes could only be 
implemented with union approval. The unions were split over this issue and the strained 
relations between the members of the CCSU eventually led to the PCS dismantling the CCSU 
in December 2010. PCS submitted a legal challenge to the act but this was dismissed in 
August 2011. The unions have also fought proposed changes to pension entitlements and 
industrial action took place throughout 2011 on pay, pensions and the CSCS changes. 30 
June saw joint industrial action taken by PCS with three other unions. Further co-ordinated 
action took place on 30 November, with nearly 30 unions taking part in one of the largest 
co-ordinated actions ever seen in the UK. Such co-ordinated action is considered to be key 
to resisting public sector cuts (Hodder and French, 2010) and alongside the strike action, the 
PCS initiated a judicial review in October 2011 against proposed changes in indexation of the 
pension scheme from the Retail Price Index to the Consumer Price Index, but lost the appeal 
in March 2012. 
 
In 2012, the government also announced reforms to the amount of time-off union officials 
could have for trade union activities, known as facilities time. The reforms have meant that 
the total amount of time-off by union representatives should represent no more than 0.1 
per cent of the civil service pay bill, with the Cabinet Office noting that “Facility agreements 
should reflect […] the default position that Civil Servants who are TU representatives should 
spend at least 50% of their time delivering their Civil Service job” (Cabinet Office, 2012, p. 
6). Additionally, there have been threats to the way in which the union collects membership 
subscription as civil servants have had their union subscriptions deducted by employer 
through a process known as check-off and it is unclear how much longer this process will 
continue (PCS, 2014). 
 
At the time of writing, the Coalition Government’s announced programme of job cuts and 
civil service reorganisation has yet to be fully implemented and so it is not possible to assess 
the full impact this will have for public sector workers and the subsequent knock-on effect it 
may have on the private sector. 
 
3. Assessing civil service trade unionism 
Having outlined the main reforms of the civil service, this section considers the implications 
for the behaviour and nature of civil service unions. It will be argued that the development 
of trade unionism in the civil service follows Willman’s (1980) concepts of independent and 
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management sponsored trade unionism. Independent trade unionism “has grown in the 
face of managerial resistance” whereas management sponsored unionism develops “under 
the regime of direct or indirect managerial promotion” of trade unionism (Willman, 1980, p. 
43). Willman drew on the work of Terry (1978, p. 6, 1979, p. 386) who used the terms in 
reference to shop steward organisation and the limited nature of local-level trade unionism 
in the public sector. It is suggested that the terminology can be applied in a wider sense and 
it is argued that the civil service unions have shifted between independent and 
management sponsored stances over time. Whilst the adoption of these concepts have 
limitations, they provide a useful framework for analysing the overall development of trade 
unionism within the civil service. To be clear, the adoption of Willman’s notion of 
management sponsored unionism, does not equate to “yellow unionism” or “company 
unionism”, being unable to control elections or internal union actions (Willman, 1980, p. 
43). Rather it is used to show a significant level of state (managerial) support for the 
existence of civil service unionism in a specific time period following the introduction of 
Whitley Councils into the civil service. 
 
As noted by Simms, the behaviour of a union in the early stages of its development “can set 
the ‘tone’ of trade unionism in the future” (Simms, 2007, p. 127). The development of early 
civil service unions is thus important in understanding the current state of the civil service 
unions. Whilst early unions were not forbidden, they found it difficult to achieve 
concessions on behalf of their members. To use Willman’s terminology, these early unions 
in the civil service were independent, eventually forcing recognition or “reluctant 
acknowledgement” by the state as employer (Humphreys, 1958). This initial relationship 
was uneasy and the difficulties experienced in maintaining industrial peace in the service 
during the First Word War led to the establishment of the Whitley Committee. Therefore it 
can be argued that recognition witnessed a move away from independent trade unionism 
towards the development of management sponsored organisations (Willman, 1980). 
 
Civil service unions were organised around grade, profession or department and 
experienced relatively high levels of membership density. Under the Whitley system, they 
were referred to as the National Staff Side until the formation of the CCSU in 1980. The 
Council was designed to act as the collective body of the different unions in negotiations at 
national level and provided the structures for greater collaboration between the unions. 
Pay, terms and conditions were bargained for collectively through unified national 
bargaining via the National Whitley Council. The civil service trade unions were “highly 
centralized, with relatively little involvement of the membership” (Fairbrother, 1994, p. 7). 
This was a reflection on the civil service generally, as changes were sought to ensure the 
civil service had “strong central control, closer links between departments and standardized 
recruitment to obtain the most efficient personnel for each level of work” (Humphreys, 
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1958, p. 17). The unions seemingly replicated this structure, as local issues were referred up 
through the hierarchy to national representatives who made the most important union 
decisions, despite being far removed from the majority of the membership. Under this 
system, there was “limited scope for local bargaining but generally local-level industrial 
relations were rather muted” (Ironside and Seirfert, 2000, p. 53). Thus, it can be said that 
government support for trade unions through Whitleyism created a specific, management 
sponsored, type of unionism, “typically committed to lobbying, consultation and reasoned 
argument, rather than militant mobilization, as the primary means by which to represent 
the interests of their members to managers and ministers” (Fisher, 2004, p. 165). The 
unions benefitted from being management sponsored and the relatively progressive nature 
of personnel policies experienced in the civil service led to the government being seen as a 
“model employer”. Civil service trade unionism remained very much in the professional 
association mould, being moderate in nature. 
 
However, the period of sustained civil service reform which began with the Fulton Report 
caused a mixed response amongst the unions as it was unclear what immediate impact the 
report would have in practice. This saw the first hints at independence, with the Civil Service 
Clerical Association (CSCA) adopting a strike policy in 1969 citing the possible reforms as 
justification. Indeed, in the Strike Policy statement, the union argued that “if there is a 
desire, as there appears to be to create a civil service on modern business lines then it can 
be expected that civil service trade unionism will change to meet the new aggressive 
competitiveness inherent in such changes” (CSCA in Parris, 1973, p. 197). 
 
The 1981 civil service strike detailed above was based upon “unprecedented degree of unity 
and cooperation” between the different civil service unions, and enabled selective strikes 
across the civil service, imposing “heavy costs and inconvenience on the government by 
delaying the collection of tax revenue and interfering with the collection and analysis of 
economic and financial data” (Winchester, 1983, p. 172). However the strike was ultimately 
unsuccessful. This had significant repercussions for the civil service unions and survey 
evidence suggested that by the mid-1980s, most civil service union members “seemed 
reconciled to the notion that their unions were ineffective” (Achike and Cowling, 1992, p. 3). 
The government responded to the 1981 strike by pursuing more far reaching “reform” as 
well as taking the unprecedented step of banning union membership amongst staff at the 
GCHQ (Lanning and Norton-Taylor, 1991). 
 
The changes introduced following the creation of the first Executive Agency caused 
problems for the civil service unions and saw their relationship with the state as employer 
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deteriorate. The government as employer was now far removed from the concept of a 
model employer, and it has been suggested that by the 1990s, it was “following rather than 
leading, private sector personnel and employment policies” (Duncan, 2001, p. 29). This had 
implications for trade unionism across the service and the decline of the national unified 
Whitley system and deterioration of government support, over time, gradually saw a move 
to a more independent, militant form of trade unionism. The unions reacted differently to 
the reforms introduced throughout the 1980s and 1990s but were on a significantly weaker 
footing as a result of the 1981 strike defeat and “although the largest union was opposed, 
the association for junior and middle managers saw some advantages” (Burnham and Pyper, 
2008, p. 215). These different attitudes reflected the impact the restructuring had on the 
composition, power and size of the different unions and were further emphasised by the 
divergence in industrial relations practices across the departments and agencies (Mathieson 
and Corby, 1999). Some departments and agencies maintained the managerial support and 
sponsorship of union/management relations but in others, the pro-union rhetoric that was 
once commonplace in civil service literature began to disappear (Mathieson and Corby, 
1999, p. 200). 
 
Like the majority of public sector unions in the 1980s, civil service unions were historical in 
their make-up and had relatively weak systems for local representation due to the long-
standing importance of the National Whitley system. Indeed, the “absence of effective shop 
stewards or staff representatives obviously reflected the limited opportunities for 
negotiation at the local level” (Winchester, 1983, p. 160). Whilst there were “tentative” 
moves towards the development of coherent and active workplace structures, the different 
civil service unions still appeared, in the main, “reluctant to take the necessary steps to build 
workplace structures” (Fairbrother, 1994, p. 179). By the mid-1990s, four of the civil service 
unions began developing regional levels of organisation, basing full-time officials outside 
London and attempting to engage in a more member-led approach to union affairs 
(Fairbrother, 1996, p. 23). The unions all experienced declining membership levels and 
attempted to respond to this by offering a range of financial and individual services as a 
recruitment initiative (Fisher, 2004, p. 165) as well as through mergers. 
 
Indeed, the overall decline in civil service employment, alongside the end of unified national 
bargaining “put a strain on unions” resources and caused intensification of effort in servicing 
members’ (Mathieson and Corby, 1999, p. 200), and a number of mergers took place 
amongst the civil service unions. In the early 1990s, there were three main unions 
representing lower and middle grade civil servants, the Inland Revenue Staff Federation 
(IRSF), the National Union of Civil and Public Servants (NUCPS) and the Civil and Public 
Servants Association (CPSA). All of these unions were formed through a process of mergers 
and amalgamations. The earlier mergers were aimed at strengthening organisation across 
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the civil service but the mergers that took place in the 1990s were used to rationalise unions 
as bargaining became increasingly fragmented following the creation of agencies. The 
merger of IRSF and NUCPS in 1996 to form the Public Services, Tax and Commerce Union 
(PTC) was therefore a complex process with “intertwined territorial, political, and 
democratic dimensions” (Undy, 2008, p. 157). PTC then held a series of discussions with the 
CPSA between 1996 and 1998 with the aim to create an almost textbook collective 
bargaining case for industrial unionism as outlined by Clegg (1976, p. 53). Such 
rationalisation was required as both unions “operated in duplicate in virtually all the 
growing number (over 300) of delegated bargaining units” (Undy, 2008, p. 158). After a 
large number of internal political battles, the two unions merged in 1998 to create the PCS 
union – a single union for lower and middle grade civil servants. 
 
By the turn of the century, the relatively weak state of the civil service unions, and their 
commitment to “compromise, rather than confrontation” (Fisher, 2004, p. 165) combined 
with a New Labour government pushing the rhetoric of the third-way politics saw a 
partnership arrangement being signed by the government and the unions. Union-
management partnership, once advocated by the Trades Union Congress (Mason et al., 
2004) has been criticised and it has been suggested that it “undermines workplace 
organisation through the marginalisation and alienation of workplace activists” (Samuel, 
2005, p. 59). However, as noted above, there was never a strong tradition of workplace 
activism within the civil service and the agreement was instead viewed as an attempt to 
return to the more traditional, management sponsored, type of civil service trade unionism, 
being viewed by the unions as “neo-Whitleyism” (Prowse and Prowse, 2007, p. 54). 
 
Following a change in union leadership in 2001, PCS has switched politically moving away 
from the partnership agreement signed in 2000 and pursued by the previous General 
Secretary. Whilst the unions did not formally depart from the partnership arrangements 
(McCarthy, 2010), they began to challenge the government’s agenda for change and 
develop into more, independent organisations (Fairbrother et al., 2012, p. 146). The election 
of Mark Serwotka as General Secretary alongside a left-wing National Executive committee 
led to “both an increased emphasis on a militant bargaining agenda, with ‘ambitious’ 
bargaining goals; and a willingness to use collective mobilisations, such as strikes, to achieve 
the union’s bargaining aims” (McCarthy, 2010, pp. 186-187). Indeed, the PCS felt the need 
to invest in organising and the development of workplace activists as a result of the 
fragmentation of bargaining units and the creation of agencies. Union organising is difficult 
to define precisely, being described as “a broad hook on which to hang many ideas and 
practices” (Gall, 2009, p. 5). Different unions use the term in a number of different ways and 
there has been academic debate regarding the role of the rank and file (Fairbrother, 2000) 
compared to the role of union leadership in the development of a form of managerial 
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unionism (Heery and Kelly, 1994). However, from a PCS perspective, the organising 
approach deployed by the union constitutes more of a hybrid form of these competing 
approaches, termed “managed activism” (Heery et al., 2000; Simms, 2007; Hodder, 2013). 
The PCS has continued with this organising approach and militant industrial action with 
various degrees of success in terms of membership growth (Hodder et al., 2014). Under the 
Coalition government, the recent attacks on facilities time (Hodder et al., 2013) and check-
off of union dues have seen the last bastions of management sponsorship threatened and 
the PCS itself is advocating full “independence” from employer (PCS, 2014). 
 
In summary, the lack of strong workplace trade unionism in the civil service can be 
attributed to the historical reliance on national Whitley structures which created a distinct, 
management sponsored type of trade unionism. However the fragmentation of bargaining 
and the “challenge of the last three decades also taught PCS to behave rather more like a 
trade union” (Fairbrother et al., 2012, p. 162). By contrast, FDA and Prospect remain more 
moderate in nature, reflecting their historical development and the grades of their 
membership. This builds upon earlier work by Terry who suggested that “Management 
strategy (or the lack of it) is the most important factor in explaining the development of 
organization” (Terry, 1982, p. 15). The increased drive towards efficiency detailed earlier in 
this paper largely occurred at a time where the “UK variation of HRM has increasingly 
marginalised trade unions, with the state and employers excluding them from collective 
relations” (Tuckman and Finnerty, 1998, p. 450). Thus it is argued that the behaviour of the 
state as employer, clearly having been influenced by changes in private sector employment 
relation, has had implications for the development of a more independent form of civil 
service trade unionism. 
 
4. Discussions and conclusions 
In summary, it can be said that the continuing programme of civil service management and 
reform has arguably seen a shift towards a more unitary form of employment relations, 
based around hard HRM practices and increased control over labour processes (Boyne et al., 
1999; Worrall et al., 2010). Following the establishment of the Whitley system, civil service 
employment relations developed in a particular style (in line with the rest of the public 
sector) and had four key features (Farnham and Horton, 1996; Boyne et al., 1999). First, the 
state as employer operated with a paternalistic style of management. Second, there were 
standardised employment practices in place across the civil service until the creation of 
Executive Agencies in the late 1980s. Third, due to Whitleyism, the system of employment 
relations was collectivised and finally, “public organizations aspired to be ‘model employers’ 
and thereby set standards for private organizations to follow” (Boyne et al., 1999, p. 409). 
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However, it has been suggested that this “traditional pattern of HRM in the public sector is, 
by assumption, a barrier to better organizational performance” (Boyne et al., 1999, p. 411). 
The increasing importance of the Efficiency Unit throughout the 1980s saw a shift away 
from a paternalistic management style towards what has been described by Boyne et al. 
(1999, p. 410) as “rational management” and, by implication, “a rational style of HRM”. 
Consequently, the changes experienced in the civil service have meant that employment 
relations are now “increasingly perceived as autocratic with declining reciprocal trust” 
(Worrall et al., 2010, p. 120), with a focus on the development and implementation of “new 
instruments of control and accountability” (Peters and Pierre, 1998, p. 227) not previously 
seen in central government. Thus, the distinction between the “traditional and modern 
public management styles” (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994, p. 9) is evident and it is clear that, in 
pursuing a programme of efficiency, there has been a move towards the private sector 
model of “managers, markets and measurement” (Butterfield et al., 2005, p. 330). Such 
changes illustrate the employment relations implications of the “hollowing out of the state” 
thesis, as proposed by Rhodes (1994). Whilst there was an attempt to return to elements of 
the traditional employment relations system with the Labour government’s introduction of 
partnership, this was not successful, partly due to the fact that the civil service unions 
“ultimately treated partnership as an extension of a Whitley system that was itself subject 
to a changing industrial relations climate” (Martin, 2010, p. 229). Additionally, it can be said 
that New Labour’s view of partnership as non-conflictual and unitary in nature (McIlroy, 
2009, p. 83) alongside their admission that “partnership is not dependent on union 
presence” (French, 2000, p. 68) further undermined any serious attempt at returning to the 
more traditional model of civil service employment relations. Thus, successive Conservative, 
Labour and Coalition governments have largely adopted the same neo-liberal agenda with 
regards to civil service employment relations and the current programme of austerity means 
this is likely to continue. 
 
From a union perspective, the development of civil service trade unionism is clearly a 
product of circumstance. The path dependent nature of trade unionism is evident however 
the move towards organising by the PCS is a break away from traditional civil service 
unionism and indicates “that public service unions have strengthened their management 
processes to direct union efforts at critical organisational goals” (Bach and Kolins Givan, 
2011, p. 2354). Thus, the continuing shift between independent and management 
sponsored status illustrated in this paper is evidence that, paraphrasing Marx, “trade unions 
make their own history but not necessarily in circumstances of their choosing” (Gall, 2006, 
p. 236). 
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From humble beginnings, the response of civil service unions to early reforms led to their 
recognition, and the development of the formal centralised Whitley systems that shaped 
civil service industrial relations for much of the twentieth century. The Whitley system and 
its form of trade unionism has been described as complex in nature since its introduction 
and marked quite a change for employment relations in the civil service. Much has changed 
since then and government support for trade unionism is no longer evident due to 
numerous reforms and restructuring. Crucially, these changes have resulted in the 
dissolution of the formal Whitley system and although bargaining is still conducted at a 
national level, it is fragmented between departments and agencies. This increased the scope 
for the different terms and conditions to develop across the civil service, causing problems 
for civil service unionism. 
 
Civil service reform has been relentless since the 1980s and it could be suggested that the 
organising approach of the PCS has almost certainly helped the union in its fight against cuts 
and attacks on terms and conditions. However, the current programme of reform will be of 
great concern to the unions, particularly the PCS as the union is still losing members as a 
result of the restructuring. Whilst the union has outlined an alternative ideological, 
economic and political strategy to the cuts, the Conservative led Coalition continues to 
plough on with the reforms. 
 
Union recognition and the relatively high-union density levels in the civil service have 
assisted unions in resisting public sector cuts so far but these are both under threat. With 
some of the proposed reforms yet to be fully implemented, it is unclear what both the short 
and long-term future of the civil service will entail. Thus, it is also too soon to say what 
impact the current restructuring will have on the civil service unions and the extent to which 
the unions can successfully challenge the reforms. What is clear, however, is that the unions 
(and in particular PCS) will continue to fight and oppose job cuts and further reform by 
nature of their shift to a more militant and independent focus. 
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